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NEEB V. LASTRAPES, AND THE CONFUSING STATE OF THE
ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF DELIVERY IN LOUISIANA
William Gaskins *
Is there a sale when the owner’s husband negotiates the deal,
the price is never agreed upon, neither the buyer nor the real owner
signs the document of sale, and the buyer moves into the house
only to be replaced by the old owner after a month? These are the
issues faced in the tangled 2011 Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal case Neeb v. Lastrapes. 1 This comment will recount that
odd case, and then will briefly determine its place (and that of the
Louisiana law underlying it) in relation to Roman and French civil
law.
I. BACKGROUND AND THE DECISION OF THE COURT
In September of 2005, shortly after the Hurricane Katrina
disaster, John Lastrapes contacted Anne Neeb via email about
purchasing her house in Metairie, just outside of New Orleans.
Mrs. Neeb responded that she planned to sell her house for
$415,000; fifteen days later, Mr. Lastrapes sent her a $10,000
“deposit,” which Mrs. Neeb accepted into her bank account. Then,
Mr. Neeb (who did not share in his wife’s ownership) faxed an
“agreement to sell real estate” to Mr. Lastrapes. The document
proposed the price of $415,000 for the sale of the property, and
was signed by Mr. Neeb, purportedly as a proxy for his wife; yet
neither Mr. Lastrapes nor Mrs. Neeb ever signed the contract.
Despite this, the Neebs removed some, but not all, of their
possessions from the home, and vacated the home themselves. The
Lastrapes then moved in, changed the locks, erected a fence, and

* Candidate, J.D. and D.C.L. at Louisiana State University Law Center
(2013). He thanks Professor Olivier Moréteau for his assistance.
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removed all of the yard’s existing landscape plants except the
grass.
After inhabiting the house for one month, Mr. Lastrapes called
Mrs. Neeb and told her he would not be purchasing the property.
He promptly quit the home, and the Neebs moved back in, all of
this in such short time that the Neebs were able to host their family
meal there on Thanksgiving Day (November 25, 2005). In the
three years that followed before the trial began, Mrs. Neeb claimed
a “homestead exemption” on the home and paid its property taxes,
specifically admitting that she was the owner of the house in
August, September, October, and November of 2005. Mrs. Neeb
filed suit against Lastrapes in April of 2006, eventually alleging
that the Lastrapes reneged on a valid obligation to buy the house.
Despite the complicated nature of the matter, the Fifth Circuit
made quick work of it on appeal. The Fifth Circuit overturned the
trial court decision and declared that no sale occurred because the
seller’s delivery and the buyer’s subsequent possession were too
transitory to be valid. 2 To be sure, the facts of the case are
peculiar; but given how far the parties went in transferring the
house, might not one argue that even the murkily-wrought delivery
between the Neebs and the Lastrapes was more than sufficient to
result in a valid sale?
II. COMMENTARY
A. The Louisiana Law, and Its Relation to French and Roman Law
The court’s decision is based on Louisiana Civil Code art.
1839, which states in pertinent part that, “A transfer of immovable
property must be made by authentic act or by act under private
signature.” 3 As an exception to that rule the Civil Code states,
2. Id. at 282. As a secondary line of reasoning seemingly based on the
same assumptions as those above, the court noted that a valid sale requires
ascertainment of thing, price, and consent, and those factors were not fulfilled in
this case. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2439.
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1839.
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“Nevertheless, an oral transfer is valid between the parties when
the property has been actually delivered and the transferor
recognizes the transfer when interrogated under oath.” 4 In other
words, oral transfers of immovables are valid when 1) there is
actual delivery and 2) the seller admits to the transfer. There is no
definition of “delivery” for immovables in Louisiana law except
that in Civil Code art. 2477, which only treats immovables
transferred by writing; 5 the question thus arises, how should a
court determine whether a delivery of immovables without a
writing has taken place?
In Roman law, the earliest way to make a sale was by delivery
of the thing (in French, tradition réelle). 6 From the requirement of
actual delivery, there arose formalistic doctrines which integrated
various degrees of fiction to take the place of delivery. In tradition
symbolique, delivery of the entire thing was replaced with delivery
of a smaller thing that represented or came from the bigger one.
Another method was delivery by long hand (longa manu), which
allowed the seller to merely show the thing to the buyer to effect a
sale. Another method of effecting a sale, and one useful when the
buyer had already possessed the thing, was delivery by short hand
(brevi manu), in which the seller merely declared the buyer to be
the owner. In such situations of pre-sale possession by the buyer,
the parties might instead effect delivery by adding an additional
element to the underlying contract, such as a usufruct, in order to
make the contract valid (tradition feinte). 7 Through all of these
institutions, delivery remained the element necessary to effect a
sale; only the degree of fiction allowed in the delivery changed.
Later, Old French law came up with nothing new, and used the
4. Id.
5. Concerning immovables, “Delivery of an immovable is deemed to take
place upon execution of the writing that transfers its ownership.”
6. ROBERT POTHIER, TRAITÉ DU DROIT DOMAINE DE PROPRIÉTÉ 126-32
(M. Hutteau fils, 2006); MARCEL PLANIOL, 1 TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW 52932 (Louisiana State Law Institute trans., William S. Hein & Co., 2005)
7. Id.
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Roman methods of delivery and fictitious delivery to satisfy the
continued requirement of delivery for the validation of a sale. 8
Notwithstanding the reverence of the French for Roman law,
the 1804 Code civil made a complete break from the past on the
subject of consecration of a sale. Whereas the necessity of
delivery, either real or fictitious, had always been the rule in civil
law before, the drafters of the Code civil declared consent to be the
new means of sale. Article 1589, in both the 1804 Code civil and
that of today, reads: “La promesse du vente vaut vente, lorsqu’il y
a consentement réciproque des deux parties sur la chose et sur le
prix.” 9 Furthermore, in article 1583, “[La vente] est parfaite entre
les parties, et la propriété est acquise de droit à l’acheteur à l’égard
du vendeur, dès qu’on est convenu de la chose et du prix, quoique
la chose n’ait pas encore été livrée ni le prix payé.” 10 In other
words, the French Code civil has held since its conception that
consent is what consecrates a sale. Planiol argues that the effect of
the new rule is the same as that of the old because Roman delivery
was often fictitious, and might as well have not occurred; 11 yet the
fundamental theory underlying sale was certainly changed in 1804.
Even where the Code civil requires writing to prove a sale, consent
is nonetheless the real modern method for achieving the sale, and
writing is merely proof of the consent. 12
Louisiana law states that, “[a] party who demands performance
of an obligation must prove the existence of the obligation;”13
likewise the French Code civil says, “[c]elui qui réclame
8. PLANIOL, supra note 6, at 532.
9. “The promise of sale becomes validly a sale when there is reciprocal
consent of the two parties on the thing and the price.” CODE CIVIL art. 1589 (fr.)
(years 1804 and 2005). Note that the modern-day article adds a stipulation for
land that is to be divided into allotments.
10. “[The sale] is perfect between the parties, and the property is acquired
by law by the buyer with regard to the vendor, when there is agreement on the
thing and the price, although the thing has not yet been delivered, nor the price
paid.” CODE CIVIL art. 1583 (fr.) (years 1804 and 2005).
11. PLANIOL, supra note 6, at 533-34.
12. PLANIOL, supra note 6, at vol. II, 564.
13. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1831.
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l’exécution d’une obligation doit la prouver.” 14 Doubtless this idea
is the reason for the requirement that a sale be validated by a
writing in authentic form. Perhaps the allowance for sale by
delivery in Louisiana Civil Code art. 1839 serves the same
purpose: not as a way around the requirement of proof of a
transfer, but simply as another, more ancient method of proof.
Whatever the reason for the delivery provision, its effect is exactly
that: although modern civil law doctrine has otherwise abandoned
its old method of consecrating a sale of an immovable, one
Louisiana Civil Code article keeps alive the tradition of
consecration by delivery.
B. Interpreting the Louisiana Rule and Neeb in Light of Legal
History
In Neeb v. Lastrapes, the court declared that Mrs. Neeb did not
meet the Louisiana Civil Code art. 1839 requirement that property
be “actually delivered,” despite the facts that the Neebs moved out
of their house, that they removed most of their possessions, that the
Lastrapes moved into the house and lived there for a month, and
that the Lastrapes changed the locks, dug up all of the plants, and
erected a fence around the property. It seems that under ancient
Roman and Old French law such actions would have constituted
not just fictional but real delivery of the immovable into the hands
of the sellers. Thus, the court’s decision that the actions do not
satisfy the delivery provision under Louisiana Civil Code art. 1839
departs from, not only the ancient law of delivery, but also the
words themselves in the modern allowance for valid sale when 1)
“the property has been actually delivered” and 2) “the transferor
recognizes the transfer.” 15
Present-day law of sale in both France and Louisiana is based
upon consent, rather than the ancient doctrine of sale by delivery.
14. “He who claims the execution of an obligation must prove it.” CODE
1315 (fr.) (1804 and 2005).
15. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1839.
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Yet one article of the Louisiana Civil Code—article 1839—pays
tribute to the ancient Roman and Old French delivery law.
Unfortunately, the short explanation of the court in Neeb leaves
readers to wonder why the lengthy and multi-faceted delivery to
and possession by the Lastrapes was not sufficient for the property
to have been “actually delivered” and thus to result in a valid sale.
Perhaps a future case will explain this questionable departure from
both the written and the historical law; but if to have our
explanation we must wait for another case with facts as odd as
those in Neeb, we may have to wait a long time.

